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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Model Penal Code: Sentencing project (MPCS) is nothing like a 
book, journal article, or dissertation. There is no unifying narrative thread 
and no manageable number of discrete storylines. Instead, it is a 
compendium of recommendations concerning important topics that arise in 
the sentencing codes of the American states. This is a broad field of 
coverage, a bit uncertain in definition, embracing many ‘subtopics’ that 
have consumed whole academic careers.1 Because of its scope, the project 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ James Annenberg Levee Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Reporter, American 
Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing revision project. 
 1. The ‘purposes of sentencing’ provision of the revised Mo el Penal Code (Code) section 
1.02 raises questions of utilitarian goals and proportionality in sentencing that have spawned entire 
libraries of commentary. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1985). For example, Andrew von Hirsch 
has spent the bulk of a distinguished career articulating and refining the theory of just deserts, 
sometimes joined by the eminent British scholar Andrew Ashworth. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, 
CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 1 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH &  ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE 
SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1–4 (2005). The philosopher Joel Feinberg produced, 
among other works, a classic four-volume set on utilitarian theory (Millsian) in criminal 
punishment. See generally 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
OTHERS (1984) (discussing the concept of harm and its relation to various interests, wants, hurts, 
offenses, rights and consent); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE 
TO OTHERS (1985) (discussing “offense” as a state distinct from harm); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986) (discussing legal paternalism and 
personal autonomy and the concepts of voluntariness and consent); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988) (discussing the right to criminalize 
on the grounds of moral wrongfulness and the consequences and ground for harming). Over nearly 
forty years of scholarship, Norval Morris, and now Richard Frase, have expounded and explored a 
theory of limiting retributivism. See generally Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory 
and Practice, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363–65 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) 
(reviewing and expanding upon Morris’s theory). 
The first several lines of the revised § 1.02(2), since their earliest appearance in draft form, 
1
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encounters some subjects of genuine importance that have received little or 
no attention.2 
One contribution of the MPCS is its examination of existing sentencing 
systems across the states and their histories over the past thirty years.3 It is 
challenging, and at times tedious, to study and think about a large number 
of jurisdictions while pursuing a substantive inquiry. Most existing 
scholarship fails to take such a multi-systems perspective. Indeed, in 
academic literature, state criminal justice policy as a universe is badly 
neglected in favor of narrow federal-centric scholarship.4 Roughly 95% of 
                                                                                                                     
have been examined in numerous books and law review articles. It has been criticized by adherents 
of desert theory as too utilitarian, and by strong utilitarians as too much grounded in desert. Se  VON 
HIRSCH &  ASHWORTH, supra, at 180–85 (2005) (arguing the provision is too utilitarian and 
insufficiently bounded by desert); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Looking at the 
Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions through Canadian Lenses, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 
169 (2003) (contending that revised Code is too utilitarian); Richard S. Frase, Punishment 
Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76, 78 (2005) (approving of revised Code’s approach as similar to 
Norval Morris’s theory of limiting retributivism); Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the Model 
Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 135, 140–41 (2003) (arguing 
that revised Code gives insufficient prominence to utilitarian goal of “public safety”); Michael H. 
Marcus, Limiting Retributivism: Revisions to Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions, 29 
WHITTIER L. REV. 295, 301–02 (2007) (arguing that revised Code gives insufficient prominence to 
utilitarian goal of “public safety”); Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation: 
Criminal Justice’s Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 674 (2004) (identifying the lack of 
priority given to “public safety” as one factor contributing to the gap between sentencing research 
and sentencing practices); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 146 (2008) (arguing that the revised Code 
offers inadequate desert constraints upon sentences); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 50 (2003) (offering the suggestion that, instead of “retributive” limits on 
utilitarianism, the revised Code should speak in terms of “proportionality” limits); James Q. 
Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 87–89 (2003) (claiming that the 
revised Code misses an opportunity to discredit retribution theory); Malcolm Thorburn & Allan 
Manson, The Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278, 278, 310 (2007) (reviewing VON HIRSCH &  ASHWORTH, supra (favoring 
retributive just deserts approach over revised § 1.02)). 
 2. For example, the awarding or withholding of good time credits can make an enormous 
difference in the duration of prison stays, and has become an especially important component of 
some determinate sentencing systems, where corrections officials have become powerful back-end 
decisionmakers. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 244.01, .04, .05, .101 (2008) (allowing for good-time 
reduction of one-third of the executed sentence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.728(1)(a)–(c) 
(West 2008) (allowing “earned release time” for low risk and first-time offenders up to 50% of their 
term of sentence; for serious violent and sex offenses up to 10%; and for other offenders up to 
33%). If good-time discretion is exercised arbitrarily, we have not realized much improvement over 
the bad old days of parole release. However, based only on anecdotal evidence, this seems not to be 
the case as I am told that good time in these states is usually awarded as a matter of routine. Yet, 
virtually no contemporary literature exists on the subject of good time in theory or practice.  
 3. The raw informational value of a project of this kind may be an end in itself. Se  Herbert 
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 466–67 
(1961). 
 4. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law 
Review Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 645–50 (1993) (describing need for increased 
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criminal cases arise and are sentenced in state courtrooms, yet an 
overwhelming share of academic writing on criminal sentencing law deals 
exclusively with the federal system.5  
This is a gaping weakness in our national law reform discourse. State 
sentencing systems are vastly different from their federal counterpart, and 
from each another.6 While the federal system is widely regarded as a 
failure (and there are state systems that deserve a similar judgment), some 
states have nurtured successful innovations in sentencing law—some large 
in scale.7 No single jurisdiction comes close to perfection, of course, and 
no one state has a monopoly on best practices. However, there have been 
many experiments in individual states that have performed reasonably well 
in light of their intended goals. (In the criminal justice field, to say that a 
reform has “performed reasonably well” is the highest possible 
compliment.)8 
                                                                                                                     
attention to sentencing reform activity at state level). 
 5. Id. If anything, this misallocation of intellectual resources has gotten worse since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005), which concluded 
that the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004), 
applies to Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Most states adapted relatively easily to the new Sixth 
Amendment requirements for the sentencing process announced in Bookerand Blakely. MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B Reporter’s Note 310–18 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). For 
additional details on post-Blakely legislation in the states, including extended statutory excerpts, see 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Statutory Appendix 53-136 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2005). 
 6. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 25–71 (1996); Richard S. Frase, State 
Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1190, 1194 (2005). 
 7. Various authors discuss the many failures of federal sentencing law, at least in its pre-
Booker phase. See KATE STITH &  JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 5, 7, 103 (1998); AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, 
Reporter’s Introduction 115–24 (2003) (illustrating many problems with the federal sentencing law 
through a comparison with the proposed Model Penal Code). Michael Tonry has gone so far as to 
say that “[t]he guidelines developed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission . . . are the most 
controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in U.S. history.” TONRY, supra note 6, at 72. 
In the same work, Tonry contrasts the relative successes of many state sentencing guidelines 
systems. See id. at 25–71. For a more up-to-date evaluation of the experiences of state sentencing 
reform jurisdictions, see Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 1194. Various authors 
provide excellent in-depth analyses of individual state systems. See generally David Boerner & 
Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 71 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001) (discussing Washington State); Richard S. Frase, 
Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
131 (Michael Tonry ed., 2005) (discussing Minnesota); Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of 
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2000, in 29 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39 
(Michael Tonry ed., 2002) (discussing North Carolina); William H. Pryor, Jr., Circuit Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Keynote Address for the Symposium: Sentencing: 
What’s at Stake for the States? Lessons of a Sentencing Reformer from the Deep South (Jan. 21, 
2005), in 105 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944 (2005) (discussing Alabama).  
 8. On the theme of spectacular failure in criminal justice reform efforts, see DAVID J. 
ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE 
AMERICA 7, 9 (1st ed. 1980). See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY 
3
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It requires sustained study to parse and compare the many local 
examples that make up “American sentencing law.” Because of the paucity 
of such work, lawmakers and policymakers throughout the nation function 
in high ignorance, usually unaware of reform breakthroughs in other 
jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, Washington, Virginia, or North Carolina, 
that have been in effect for ten, twenty, or even thirty years.9 B andeis’ 
laboratory cannot operate as it should if we are paying insufficient attention 
to state-level experiments. 
The revised Code’s target audience includes state legislators, governors, 
attorneys general, judges, lawyers, sentencing commissioners, corrections 
officials, policymakers, and opinion leaders who play a role in the 
development of state sentencing law.10 The MPCS may also be of interest 
to legal academics and law students who wish to study or participate in the 
process of law reform at the state or multi-state level, but the project does 
not seek academic recognition as a stand-alone goal. Persons connected to 
the federal sentencing system are also a subsidiary audience. The revised 
Code speaks powerfully in places to the current federal system, but more 
often it does not.11 A similar point might be made concerning the Code’s 
                                                                                                                     
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL  35–39 (1983) (examining “[t]he process of planned change” in four sectors 
of criminal justice, including sentencing reform). A general attitude of futility in the pursuit of 
criminal justice policy is also traceable to Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers 
about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 22–23 (1974). Today, it is also high praise, indeed, to say 
that a given rehabilitative program for convicted offenders “performs reasonably well.” 
 9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 10. Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for 
Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 538 (2002). To date, the MPCS proposals have received 
attention by policy organizations and state legislatures in Alabama, California, and Colorado. 
Recent sentencing commission legislation in Alabama and Colorado had important roots in the 
MPCS project.  
 11. Fundamental differences between state and federal criminal jurisdictions, criminal codes, 
geographic scale, budgetary constraints, and institutions of enforcement make it treacherous to 
engage in cross-over analysis. See generally Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 689 (1992) (discussing 
how states would not likely consider complex federal guidelines). For a discussion of the ALI’s 
determination to avoid the defining features of the federal sentencing system when preparing a 
revised Model Penal Code, see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 
115–25 (2003). 
An example of an important policy choice found in MPCS that does speak directly to the 
federal system is § 6B.06(2)(b), which demands that alleged criminal conduct for which an offender 
has not been convicted may not be used as a basis for increased sentence severity. See MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 211, 217–20, 225–27 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). The consideration of 
alleged “nonconviction” offenses at sentencing continues to be a serious problem in the post-Booker 
federal system, including charges of which the defendant has been acquitted. Indeed, the Court’s 
remedy in Booker was founded on the perceived desirability of allowing judges to violate the 
principle stated in § 6B.06(2)(b). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 296 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
opinion of the Court in part) (Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion for a 5-4 majority rested on the 
desirability of encouraging judges to sentence based on the “real facts” of the case, not the facts as 
reflected in the charges of conviction); see United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 
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relevance to the criminal justice systems in other countries. It could not be 
imported wholesale across national borders.12 
Because the MPCS has so many moving parts, this Article will focus 
selectively on three legal-policy debates that have occurred, or are still 
unfolding, in the creation of the revised Code: the demographic impact 
statement to be attached to proposed sentencing guidelines or legislation 
affecting sentences, the policy choice between advisory and presumptive 
guidelines, and the degree of determinacy or indeterminacy that a 
sentencing system ought to have. The topics are all important ones on the 
horizon of the national sentencing reform agenda. Their discussion will 
illustrate the kind of improvements in law that the MPCS seeks to promote. 
II.   A BRIEF PRIMER ON ALI  PROCESS 
Before considering specific legal-policy debates, it may help to explain 
the various stages of the American Legal Institute (ALI) drafting process. 
The footnotes to this Article are sprinkled with references to drafts and 
other materials produced in the MPCS project to date. To those uninitiated 
in the ALI’s operations, the documents’ titles may give no useful indication 
of where they stand in the project as a whole, nor is it easy to understand 
the status of the project without this knowledge. 
The “Preliminary Drafts” are new drafts at the earliest stages of the 
chronology.13 They are typically prepared by the Reporter afresh.14 
Preliminary Drafts are considered by a group of expert Advisers (including 
many non-ALI members) invited by the ALI to assist with the project, and 
by a Members Consultative Group (MCG) consisting of ALI members who 
self-select to play a role in the project.15 No votes are taken in these groups, 
                                                                                                                     
2008) (en banc) (holding that enhanced penalty based on acquitted conduct is permissible under 
post-Booker federal sentencing guidelines). 
 12. The MPCS proposals outlined in Tentative Draft No. 1 were studied in depth by England 
and Wales’ Sentencing Working Group chartered by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice. 
See SENTENCING COMMISSION WORKING GROUP, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: 
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 11, 31 (2008) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT]; LORD 
CARTER’S REVIEW OF PRISONS, SECURING THE FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR THE EFFICIENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE USE OF CUSTODY IN ENGLAND AND WALES 27–35 (2007) [hereinafter LORD CARTER’S 
REVIEW OF PRISONS]. The MPCS Reporter was appointed Adviser to the project. The Working 
Group’s final recommendations borrow from certain features of the better American systems (e.g., 
comprehensive sentencing guidelines, ongoing data collection, and the desirability of resource 
impact projections), but push in the direction of incremental change to the existing English system 
rather than wholesale reform. See SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 11, 31; LORD 
CARTER’S REVIEW OF PRISONS, supra, at 27–34 (proposing recommendations that should be made 
with respect to prisons, including implementation of a structured sentencing framework). 
 13. The American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, at 2 [hereinafter ALI, 
About the ALI], available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.creationinstitute 
(select “Download the ALI Brochure”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 10, at 670 (noting “[t]he advise [sic] of the Advisers 
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but the MPCS drafts change very substantially in light of feedback from the 
Advisers and MCG.16 
“Council Drafts” occupy the next stage of the drafting process.17 They 
include revisions by the Reporter that take account of the views of the 
Advisers and MCG.18 Council Drafts are considered and ultimately voted 
upon by the ALI Council,19 a group of roughly fifty ALI members elected 
to five-year terms.20 The Council is sometimes called the “Senate” of the 
organization. No draft becomes ALI policy without affirmative votes of 
both the Council and the ALI membership.21 
Upon winning the Council’s approval, and after another round of 
revisions by the Reporter, a “Tentative Draft” comes forward to the ALI 
annual meeting for a vote by the members of the organization.22 Written 
motions for amendment may be presented at the meeting. If a Tentative 
Draft receives the membership’s favorable vote, it is denoted as 
“tentatively approved” by the ALI, subject to later editorial changes.23 
Typically, ALI projects unfold through numerous Tentative Drafts that 
accumulate over a number of years into a final product (e.g., a new 
Restatement or model legislation).24 For instance, the original Model Penal 
Code had twelve Tentative Drafts, and the current project may have four or 
five. Once all Tentative Drafts have been completed and approved, the 
project as a whole is put forward to the Council and membership for “final 
approval.”25 If all goes well, multi-volume hardbound sets will soon be in 
press. 
Throughout the multiple drafting cycles, the Reporter receives a 
considerable volume of comments and suggestions from knowledgeable 
individuals and representatives of organizations, within and outside the 
ALI, who take an interest in the project.26  
                                                                                                                     
Committee, the Members Consultative Group, and others, is solicited”); s e also ALI, About the 
ALI, supra note 13, at 2 (stating Advisers include judges, lawyer, and law teachers with special 
knowledge about the subject). 
 16. ALI, About the ALI, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. The American Law Institute, Governance: Bylaws (as amended in May 2007), Bylaw 
4.04–.05, available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.bylaws (last visited June 23, 
2009). 
 21. ALI, About the ALI, supra note 13, at 2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 525–26. On some projects, the ALI collaborates with the 
American Bar Association, the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL), or both. ALI, About the ALI, supra note 13, at 2. For example, new drafting in the 
Uniform Commercial Code must be approved by both the ALI and NCCUSL. Id. 
 25. ALI, About the ALI, supra note 13, at 2. 
 26. Id. I imagine email has greatly increased the Reporters’ load in this respect, and there is 
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The current status of the MPCS project is as follows: A narrative Report 
was presented to the ALI membership in 2003 outlining the ambitions of 
the revision effort.27 After several earlier iterations, and a delay occasioned 
by the U.S. Supreme Court,28 Tentative Draft No. 1 was tentatively 
approved by the ALI membership in May of 2007, following an affirmative 
vote of the Council in late 2006.29 As of this writing, new drafting has 
reached the stage of Council Draft No. 2, which raises many issues that 
continue to be hotly debated.30 Although it has benefited from much 
discussion and collective wisdom, Council Draft No. 2 has not yet been 
formally approved at any level of the ALI. It will no doubt change 
substantially before it advances as Tentative Draft No. 2. 
Anyone wishing to be up-to-speed on the MPCS project should 
examine the Report, Tentative Draft No. 1, and the latest draft-in-
progress—roughly 700 printed pages of material.31  
III.   SELECTED LEGAL-POLICY DEBATES WITHIN THE MPCS 
A.  The Demographic Impact Statement 
Although not regularly used in the federal system, one familiar element 
of American sentencing guidelines reform at the state level is the fiscal 
                                                                                                                     
sometimes a cacophony of conflicting viewpoints in one’s inbox, but the net benefits are 
substantial. 
 27. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT (2003). 
 28.  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 297, 303–07 (2004). Blakely, rewriting the 
constitutional law of American sentencing hearings, was decided less than two weeks after the 
Advisers and MCG had given their support to a draft expected to go forward to the Council and ALI 
membership. On this schedule, Tentative Draft No. 1 would have been approved in 2005. The 5-4 
decision in Blakely, overruling every federal circuit court and every state appellate judiciary (save 
one) to have considered the issue, came as a great surprise to most observers. See Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 297; see also Sixth Amendment—Allocation of Factfinding in Sentencing, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
185, 225, 229–31 (2007) (discussing the debate among commentators disagreeing with the Blakely 
decision). Six months later, aspects of United States v. Booker were nearly as surprising as the 
precursor Blakely decision. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For a discussion of the 
new, perplexing, and contradictory aspects of this line of decisions, see Kevin R. Reitz, Th  New 
Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1082, 1087 (2005). Adaptations to MPCS drafting to accommodate Blakely, Booker, and related 
cases delayed the project two years. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 7.07A–
.07B, at 375–79 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (proposing legislative provisions to comply with 
Blakely and related cases). 
 29. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 30. There is a brief supplement to C uncil Draft No. 2: A Reporter’s Memorandum to the 
Council, dated November 23, 2008, which expands upon the draft’s commentary on the subject of 
life sentences, and the ALI’s general disapproval of sentences of life without parole. See MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 cmt. b, at 37–38 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). In a nutshell, this 
addendum would signal the ALI’s grudging endorsement of life without parole in circumstances 
where it provides the sole alternative to the death penalty. Id. 
 31. As Reporter, the author is always happy to supply a status report on the MPCS project. 
The author may be reached at reitz027@umn.edu. 
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impact statement that many sentencing commissions generate whenever 
new guidelines or statutory changes affecting sentencing are proposed.32 
Because of the predictive quality of sentencing guidelines33 combined with 
computer modeling technology, these impact statements tend to be 
relatively accurate. State legislators treat them as credible statements of 
long-term consequences.34 The shocking dollar figures in fiscal impact 
statements have often stopped punitive legislation that otherwise would 
have been voted into law, or have occasioned amendments before 
passage.35 Just as importantly, when new laws will require prison 
construction according to the impact statement, immediate planning for the 
budgetary consequences can begin.36 
Extrapolating from this proven technology,37 the MPCS project, since 
its earliest draft in 2002, has recommended that a demographic impact 
statement (DIS) should be generated by sentencing commissions and 
attached to proposed guidelines and sentencing bills alongside monetary 
impact statements.38 At a minimum, the DIS would model the racial, 
ethnic, and gender composition of future sentencing populations if the 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Professor Richard Frase reported that, as of 2005, the sentencing commissions in at least 
ten states were called upon to make fiscal impact projections. Frase, supra note 6, at 1196–1206, 
1196 tbl. 1 (noting the “resource impact” projections used on a regular basis in Arkansas, Delaware, 
Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Washington; projections 
sometimes used in the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the federal system). 
Virginia should be added to this list, see VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, 14TH ANNUAL REPORT, 
GEN. ASSEM. 11–12 (2008). 
 33. State sentencing guidelines that achieve even a moderate degree of “compliance” among 
sentencing judges render future sentencing patterns more predictable than in non-guidelines 
systems. The projections are based on the assumption that judicial compliance rates will remain 
roughly similar over time, and that departures from guidelines will likewise cluster in patterns that 
can be modeled upon past judicial behavior. 
 34. See Frase, supra note 7, at 131–32; Wright, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
 35. HENRY RUTH &  KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSE 
115 (2003). 
 36. For detailed state-specific discussions, see Boerner & Lieb, supra note 7, at 71–131; 
Wright, supra note 7, at 39–105; Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 279, 
279–81 (1993).  
 37. Sentencing commission researchers for many years have told me that the same projection 
technology used to model the future use of prison bed spaces could easily predict who, 
demographically speaking, will likely end up occupying the additional beds. The Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, the first sentencing commission to generate such projections, 
did so relatively easily by drawing upon projection models already in place. See Frase, supra note 7, 
at 279. 
 38. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(e) (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002) (one 
governing purpose of the new code is “to ensure that unjustified racial and ethnic disparities in 
sentencing are reduced or eliminated, and that reasonable steps are taken to forecast and prevent 
such unjustified disparities when laws and guidelines affecting sentencing are proposed, revised, or 
enacted”). 
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proposed change in sentencing law were to take effect. The device could 
perhaps be expanded to include other personal characteristics.  
The goals of the DIS are to bring to light sensitive information when it 
matters the most, provoke debate before new laws are passed, and create a 
mechanism for legislative accountability in the long run.39 The final 
language of the MPCS, approved by the ALI membership in 2007, is set 
out below, with subsection (3) especially relevant: 
§ 6A.07. Projections Concerning Fiscal Impact, Correctional 
Resources, and Demographic Impacts. 
 
(1) The Commission shall develop a correctional-population 
forecasting model to project future sentencing outcomes 
under existing or proposed legislation and sentencing 
guidelines. The commission shall use the model at least once 
each year to project sentencing outcomes under existing 
legislation and guidelines. The commission shall also use the 
model whenever new legislation affecting criminal 
punishment is introduced or new or amended sentencing 
guidelines are formally proposed, and shall generate 
projections of sentencing outcomes if the proposed legislation 
or guidelines were to take effect. The commission shall make 
and publish a report to the legislature and the public with each 
set of projections generated under this subsection. 
 
(2) Projections under the model shall include anticipated 
demands upon prisons, jails, and community corrections 
programs. Whenever the model projects correctional needs 
exceeding available resources at the state or local level, the 
commission’s report shall include estimates of new facilities, 
personnel, and funding that would be required to 
accommodate those needs. 
(3) The model shall be designed to project future 
demographic patterns in sentencing. Projections shall 
include the race, ethnicity, and gender of persons sentenced. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 39. The inspiration for the DIS was Michael Tonry’s argument that lawmakers should be held 
accountable for the foreseeable racial impacts of their actions. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN 
NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA vii–viii (1995). Tonry was speaking at the 
time of the 100:1 crack-powder cocaine ratio brought into federal sentencing law in 1987. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 122 (2003). With co-author 
Henry Ruth, I have offered additional thoughts about how the information generated by a DIS 
should be used. See RUTH &  REITZ, supra note 35, at 115–16. Of course, this represents the personal 
views of the authors and not an official policy of the ALI. Id. at 115. 
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(4) The commission shall refine the model as needed in light 
of its past performance and the best available information.40 
As this provision advanced through the ALI over five years, it 
encountered no opposition. However, many believed that the DIS would 
never actually be implemented by state government officials. This 
judgment was based on the fact that § 6A.07(3) asks state officials to 
require themselves to stir up the hot-button issue of race and punishment 
with every proposed guideline or sentencing law. Charges of racism, overt 
or unconscious, would be the expected currency of the ensuing debate.  
Of course, a § 6A.07(3) projection will not always complicate the 
political prospects of proposed sentencing laws or guidelines. In many 
scenarios, a DIS might be helpful to passage. For example, several 
sentencing commissions have in recent years recommended amendments to 
statutes and guidelines to roll back the use of incarceration for certain 
categories of drug offenders. They have met with mixed success in their 
legislatures.41 If such proposals had been accompanied by DISs as 
contemplated in the MPCS (none ever has), the projections would likely 
have shown that the proposed amendments would reduce preexisting racial 
and ethnic disparities in states’ imprisonment rates. Because drug offenders 
make up an especially large percentage of the nation’s growing population 
of women prisoners, the DIS might have focused legislators’ attention on 
an opportunity to confront the problem of the over-incarceration of women, 
particularly women of color.42 Putting specifics aside, in many scenarios 
the DIS could provide independent or supplemental justification for 
changes in sentencing laws that would reduce prison rates for targeted 
offenses; the push might be forceful indeed. 
Still, especially when new laws or guidelines would escalate penalties, 
the DIS may expose appalling facts, reminding everyone of existing 
disparities in punishment and projecting worse to come. This could cause 
discomfiture from numerous viewpoints. For example, a projection 
attached to a proposed increase in prison use for armed robbery might 
show that the added increment of severity would affect African Americans 
disproportionately. This could fuel allegations of racist motivation behind 
the proposed law. On the other hand, the hypothesized projection would be 
                                                                                                                     
 40. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.07, at 355–56 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 41.  See Kansas Sentencing Commission, Kansas Department of Corrections, 2003-Senate 
Bill 123: Alternative Sentencing Policy for Non-Violent Drug Possession Offenders: Operations 
Manual (July 1, 2008); Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Updated Report on Drug 
Offender Sentencing Issues (Jan. 31, 2007). The long struggle of the U.S. Supreme Court with 
crack-powder is another example. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Section 6A.07, as a 
whole, is an example of a MPCS recommendation that might be incorporated usefully into the 
federal lawmaking process. 
 42. Regarding the over-incarceration of women, especially for drug offenses, see RUTH &  
REITZ, supra note 35, at 114. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/2
2009] DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT STATEMENTS 693 
 
based on data showing higher-than-average rates of commission of armed 
robberies among African Americans in distressed urban neighborhoods. 
This datum could be used to reinforce racial stereotypes. Additional painful 
facts could arise, such as the victims of armed robbery (and other violent 
crimes) being themselves disproportionately African American. Justified 
outrage about racial disparities in punishment sometimes collides with the 
incommensurable concern that black victims have been historically—
sometimes unforgivably—underprotected by state and local law 
enforcement.43 The complexities of race, crime, victimization, and 
punishment only multiply as one examines more closely this peculiarly 
American tragedy. In many ways, § 6A.07(3) calls for a conversation no 
one wants to have.44 
Although these problems and others have hardly been resolved since the 
MPCS drafting first suggested the DIS, at least two states—Minnesota and 
Iowa—have now committed to the use of such a device. Minnesota was the 
first to put a toe in the water. In late 2007, the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission, by its own action rather than by legislation, began 
to prepare DISs to accompany the fiscal impact projections it had given its 
legislature since 1980. By consensus among staff and commissioners, the 
Commission did so shortly after learning of the MPCS recommendation. 
Isabel Gomez, a former Minneapolis trial judge who was then executive 
director of the sentencing commission, pushed for the idea and encountered 
no resistance. As Gomez explained, “The commission members thought it 
was a good idea, so we just started doing it.”45 
In Iowa, unlike in Minnesota, the DIS originated from legislation. In 
2008, shocked by statistics showing the state to be a national “leader” in 
racial disparities in incarceration, the Iowa legislature passed a new law 
requiring the legislative services agency to prepare a “correctional impact 
statement” prior to the legislative debate of any proposed change in law 
affecting criminal sentencing.46 The statement must include projections of 
“the fiscal impact of confining persons pursuant to the [proposed] 
legislation, [as well as] the impact of the legislation on minorities.”47 The 
governor’s press release termed this a “minority impact statement.”48 As of 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29–75 (1997); RUTH &  REITZ, supra 
note 35, at 32–37; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Question of Black Crime, PUB. INT., Fall 1994, at 3, 7, 9. 
 44. Government officials are not the only group reluctant to delve deeply into the realities of 
race, crime, and punishment in the United States. S e TONRY, supra note 39, at viii (explaining 
Professor Tonry’s decision to write a book about race and punishment in America came only after 
numerous potential authors had turned down his request—as editor of a book series—to author a 
monograph on the subject). 
 45. Personal conversation with Isabel Gomez, Executive Director, Minn. Sentencing 
Comm’n, February 12, 2008. 
 46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.56(1) (West 2008). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Press Release, Chet Culver, Governor, State of Iowa, Governor Culver Signs Minority 
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this writing, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission staff is 
assisting Iowa officials in their efforts to build the technical apparatus 
needed to generate their minority impact projections.49 To date, no impact 
projections have been made. 
The implementation of the DIS is too new to know how it will fare. 
Although a number of statements have been produced by the Minnesota 
Commission over the past year, none has had any observable effect on 
political debate. The state legislature in the past two years has been 
unwilling to pass sentencing legislation of any kind that would increase the 
need for prison spaces. This has been due entirely to budgetary concerns, 
including a longstanding “no new taxes” pledge by the governor, so the 
possible additional check of the DIS has not been tested. The first true test 
will come when a troubling DIS is attached to a proposed change in 
sentencing law that might otherwise be viable. 
The early DISs in Minnesota raise significant questions, however, about 
the kind of information that should be included in such projections and 
how it should be reported. Minnesota’s statements set out several 
introductory paragraphs on the current breakdown by race and ethnicity of 
the state’s general population, the total population of convicted felons, and 
the prison population (with numbers set out for whites, blacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, Asian Americans, and “other/unknown”). For example, the DIS 
states that African Americans make up only 4.3% of the state’s general 
population, but 32.1% of the state’s prisoners. Background information of 
this kind is helpful if not essential. The information is presented clearly, 
both in text and in a bar chart. However, not immediately obvious from the 
DIS is that the African American imprisonment rate is roughly thirteen 
times the white rate when computed on a per capita basis against the 
                                                                                                                     
Impact Statement Bill Into Law (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.governor.iowa.gov/news/ 
2008/04/17_2.php (last visited May 11, 2009); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.56(1). It is not clear 
that the MPCS recommendation played a direct role in Iowa’s legislation. Marc Mauer, Executive 
Director of The Sentencing Project, a Washington, D.C. nonprofit organization, was instrumental in 
Iowa’s process of passing legislation concerning racial impact statements. S e Marc Mauer, Racial 
Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 19, 19 & n.1, 46 (2007). 
 49. Reliable projections will be harder to generate in Iowa’s indeterminate sentencing system 
than within Minnesota’s guidelines structure. Part of the difficulty is that judicial sentencing 
behavior can change rapidly in an indeterminate system, especially when new criminal sentencing 
laws are put into effect. It is even more treacherous to make predictions of the parole board’s release 
decisions far into the future. Systems with a great deal of unstructured sentencing discretion at the 
front- and back-ends force correctional projection researchers to make a large number of soft 
assumptions. The picture is materially different in states with well-constructed guidelines systems. 
Stable compliance rates under guidelines, and predictable patterns in sentencing departures, 
simplify the task for state sentencing commissions. Projection researchers need make fewer guesses. 
In addition, Minnesota possesses thick retrospective data on sentencing practices compiled annually 
by the sentencing commission since 1980. These data, far superior than exist in Iowa, are 
enormously helpful to the projection process. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/2
2009] DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT STATEMENTS 695 
 
general population.50 One might ask whether a well-conceived DIS should 
make the disparity ratios explicit. Other potentially useful background 
information is omitted entirely. The Minnesota DIS does not disclose 
actual rates of imprisonment for different races and ethnic groups, and fails 
to include information about jail populations. More thought should be 
given to how much background, including historical trends and comparison 
to other states or the nation as a whole, should be reported to make the DIS 
projection intelligible in context. 
Moreover, the Minnesota DIS’ have no confident sense of direction 
concerning what sort of projection should be communicated. In one DIS, 
attached to proposed legislation that would have increased penalties for 
attempted robbery, the Commission’s impact statement states: 
Minorities are even more over-represented among persons 
sentenced to prison for attempted aggravated robbery than 
non-minorities and their sentences would be increased if this 
bill were to be adopted. Among offenders sentenced to prison 
for attempted aggravated robbery in 2006, 25.9 percent were 
white, 61.1 percent were black, 9.3 percent were American 
Indian, and 3.7 percent were Hispanic. The average increase 
in sentence length for those offenders would be 8 months for 
white offenders, 10 months for black offenders, 15 months for 
American Indian offenders, and 23 months for Hispanic 
offenders.51 
Such a statement probably does not tell the legislature or the public all 
they need to know. Let us massage the figures provided by the Commission 
in order to flesh out foreseeable impacts not driven home in the DIS. Partly 
because the white conviction rate for armed robbery is so much lower in 
Minnesota than the black conviction rate, any increased penalty increment 
for the offense could be anticipated to result in a staggering disparity ratio 
of 47:1 (the number of times the added punishment would be applied to 
black offenders relative to general population compared with its 
application to white offenders relative to general population). Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                     
 50. This calculation is possible based on the percentage figures reported in the DIS 
introduction, even if one does not know the absolute population statistics. The DIS states that 
whites are 86% of the state’s general population, and blacks are 4.3%. See Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission, Racial Impact for HF3101: Domestic Abuse No Contact Orders (Mar. 13, 
2008); Racial Impact for HF2949: Adding Salvia Divinorum to Schedule Iv Drugs (Feb. 27, 2008); 
Racial Impact for HF3175: Robbery-Increased Penalties (Feb. 29, 2008) (all on file with author). 
In contrast, whites make up 50.9% of the state’s prison population, and blacks 32.1%. See supra. 
Assuming the state’s population is 100 people, relative prison rates can be calculated from these 
numbers. It does not matter how large the state’s population actually is because the ratio of black-
to-white prison rates would remain the same. 
 51. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Racial Impact for HF3175: Robbery—
Increased Penalties 1–2 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author). 
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for each application of the proposed law in prison cases, the average 
severity increment for African Americans could be expected to be 20% 
higher than for whites (ten months versus eight). Over time, this would 
amplify the expected 47:1 differential impact.  
Thus, in a state that already experiences a 13:1 disparity ratio in black-
white prison rates, a manipulation of the statistics in the DIS tells us that 
the proposed legislation would without question exacerbate this 
disproportionality to an unknown degree. With more information, a trained 
researcher could project this figure, although it would grow year-by-year 
(assuming all else in the state’s sentencing law stayed the same) until the 
composition of the prison population reached a new equilibrium that 
reflected the stiffer sentences for attempted robberies. Merely speculating, 
this single proposed change in the criminal code might result, in five or ten 
years, in a new disparity ration of 15:1 or 16:1. It would be possible to ask 
a sentencing commission to quantify such an expected long-term impact in 
a DIS, if we thought the information important. Certainly—and this is my 
main point—the policymaking community should give careful thought to 
what goes into a DIS, in addition to the threshold question of whether there 
should be such a device at all. Section 6A.07 of the MPCS encourages 
states to consider these questions. 
As an exercise in model legislation by the ALI, § 6A.07 illustrates two 
tendencies. First, the main body of the provision,52 on fiscal impacts, was 
borrowed from existing law in a number of states. The provision sets out 
and assembles detailed background on a “best practice” that has a solid 
track record in a number of jurisdictions, and recommends other states 
follow suit. Second, subsection (3) stretches the envelope beyond anything 
before required in American law. The hope behind such an innovation is 
that a handful of states will experiment with the DIS and, if it proves 
useful, other jurisdictions will take notice. It remains to be seen whether 
this will be the course of § 6A.07(3), but the early signs are promising. 
B.  Presumptive versus Advisory Guidelines 
Beyond the DIS, the MPCS also addresses new questions that have 
arisen in the post-Blakely era of sentencing guidelines reform. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, dissenting in the 2004 decision Blakely 
v. Washington,53 offered dire warnings about the practical and political 
effects of the Court’s ruling.54 A 5-4 majority held that, under Washington 
State’s presumptive sentencing guidelines scheme, a judge may not depart 
upward from the guidelines sentencing range based on a finding of fact 
made by the judge during sentencing proceedings.55 The Court ruled that, 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See supra note 32. 
 53. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 54. Id. at 314–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 55. Id. at 297, 305 & n.8, 308–09 (majority opinion). 
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/2
2009] DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT STATEMENTS 697 
 
under the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a finding of fact legally necessary to 
support an aggravated sentence must be made by a jury under the 
reasonable doubt standard of proof.56 For reasons not easily explained, six 
months later in United States v. Booker,57 the Court held that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment principles essential to the Blakely decision had no 
application to judicial fact-finding during sentencing proceedings in an 
advisory sentencing guidelines system.58 While it is a fascinating project to 
try to untangle the Court’s jurisprudence in this area, space limitations 
force me to assume that the reader is generally familiar with the convoluted 
decisions in Blakely, Booker, and related cases.59 The necessary points for 
present purposes are: (1) the Supreme Court recently announced a 
constitutional rule that requires jury fact-finding at sentencing proceedings, 
at least some of the time, in presumptive guidelines jurisdictions; and (2) 
advisory guidelines systems are exempt from the rule.60 
Justice O’Connor’s Blakely dissent was strongly worded, even strident. 
She said, “What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over twenty 
years of sentencing reform are all but lost.”61 Her particular concern was 
that many jurisdictions would abandon successful sentencing guidelines 
reforms that had regulated judicial sentencing discretion through the use of 
legally-enforceable sentencing guidelines.62 If such systems are to be 
maintained, Justice O’Connor said, they must now pay the “constitutional 
tax” of setting up bifurcated jury fact-finding proceedings—a first trial for 
guilt and innocence, and a second to determine sentencing facts.63 Making 
matters worse, Justice O’Connor predicted that the facts juries would be 
allowed to resolve at sentencing would be far more limited than those 
judges were accustomed to weighing prior to Blakely.64 To avoid the tax, 
Justice O’Connor predicted that American legislatures would, from Blakely 
forward, prefer regimes in which judges’ sentencing discretion is 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 311–12. 
 57. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 58. Id. at 233. Although Booker generated two separate majority opinions, both commanding 
only 5-4 votes, the Court was unanimous in its view that advisory guidelines systems did not raise 
the constitutional concerns that motivated the Blakely decision. Id. at 233 & n.2, 258–59. This 
consensus view embraced not only advisory sentencing guidelines, but also traditional sentencing 
regimes in which judicial sentencing discretion is unencumbered by guidelines of any sort. Id. at 
260. 
 59. For those who want further information, see generally Reitz, supra note 28, as I have 
examined and critiqued this line of cases elsewhere.  
 60. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232–33. 
 61. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 323–24. 
 63. Id. at 318. 
 64. Id. at 319. Justice O’Connor mentioned the defendant’s perjury or obstruction of justice at 
trial as a sentencing factor that could no longer be considered at sentencing in a Blakely-compliant 
system—by judge or jury—as well as facts in aggravation of the offense that came out during the 
trial itself, e.g., the discovery that the defendant had sold drugs only to children. Id. 
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unbounded by rules.65 Thus, Justice O’Connor believed that the premium 
placed on the jury trial right in Blakely would yield perverse results in the 
long run: “The legacy of today’s opinion, whether intended or not, will be 
the consolidation of sentencing power in the State and Federal 
Judiciaries.”66 
Many dissents in Supreme Court history have charged that the sky will 
fall because of the majority’s missteps.67 Five years after Blakely, with the 
benefit of hindsight, we can begin to ask whether O’Connor’s strong words 
were prescient, or overstated. No final historical verdict is possible of 
course. But I will attempt an interim report, taking the perspective of 
someone primarily interested in the 95% of criminal cases sentenced in 
state rather than federal courts.68 The report is based on a review of post-
Blakely activities in state courts and legislatures, and educated guesses 
about what state governments will do in the next five or ten years. From 
this vantage point, Justice O’Connor’s dissent appears overstated in one or 
two important ways, but surprisingly on the mark in its assessment of 
Blakely’s unintended consequences.69 Especially when measured against 
foundational policy values of the MPCS, there have already been 
“disastrous” practical consequences in Blakely’s wake.70 
Both before and after Blakely, the MPCS project has recommended the 
use of presumptive sentencing guidelines—those that exist alongside a 
legal “departure” standard that judges must satisfy before deviating from 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 320, 321 n.1. 
 66. Id. at 314. One irony little noted in the literature is that juries’ decisions bear far greater 
relationship to the expected sentence in a presumptive guidelines system than in an advisory 
guidelines structure, or in an indeterminate system. Juries become slightly more important than 
before in the criminal process if states choose to comply with Blakely by creating jury fact-finding 
procedures at the sentencing stage, but juries are marginalized if states choose to avoid Blakely by 
adopting a discretionary system.  
 67. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 69. The federal-centric judgment is admittedly different than the view from the fifty states. 
For instance, the federal judges of my acquaintance believe their sentencing system (for now) has 
benefited from the decisions in Blakely and Booker. Congress may someday change that perception. 
See Reitz, supra note 28, at 1101 (observing that under the Court’s new Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Congress could substitute a system of mandatory minimum guidelines for the now-
advisory guidelines). My view is that the federal system has been marginally changed, probably for 
the better, but most of the features I found objectionable prior to Booker remain in place. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 115–25 (2003) (discussing 
defects in the federal guidelines system, only one of which was undue rigidity); Kevin R. Reitz, 
Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 524 (1993) 
(criticizing real-offense sentencing laws, including the “relevant conduct” provision of the federal 
sentencing guidelines); Kevin R. Reitz, Structure: The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 155, 173 (2005) [hereinafter Reitz, Structure: The Enforceability of Sentencing 
Guidelines] (“[T]he reordering of federal sentencing in United States v. Booker was far less radical 
than it first appeared.”). 
 70. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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the sentencing commission’s prescriptions.71 Successive MPCS drafts have 
never imagined that the departure standard should be tightly restrictive of 
judicial sentencing discretion, but have consistently recommended that 
guidelines be enforceable to a “modest” degree. Tentative Draft No. 1 
states that trial courts should be permitted to depart from sentencing 
guidelines for “substantial” reasons related to the statutory purposes of 
sentencing, and that departures should be subject to appellate review.72 In 
contrast, advisory guidelines have no formal, legal bite.73 They are 
recommendations rather than presumptions.74 They are sometimes 
accompanied by a departure standard, albeit an unenforceable one, and 
often include a procedural requirement that a sentencing judge give reasons 
when departing from the guidelines (but the adequacy of the reasons is not 
reviewable).75 
The majority view within the ALI has been that advisory guidelines are 
often better than no guidelines at all, but they are a weaker institutional 
tool than their presumptive counterparts for achieving important objectives 
of sentencing law reform.76 Comparing the two frameworks, presumptive 
guidelines are more often respected by judges, produce more consistency 
of thought and transparency in sentencing proceedings, are more effective 
in reducing racial disparities in sentencing decisions, are more reliable in 
introducing systemic controls on prison population growth (see previous 
section), are superior at implementing line-by-line policy priorities in how 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2005). This is the 
last pre-Blakely draft, which included a firm recommendation that states should create a system of 
presumptive guidelines. 
 72. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX(2), at 264 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) 
(“A sentencing court may base a departure from a presumptive sentence on the existence of one or 
more aggravating or mitigating factors enumerated in the guidelines or other factors grounded in the 
purposes of § 1.02 (2)(a), provided the factors take the case outside the realm of an ordinary case 
within the class of cases defined in the guidelines.”). Trial courts are also given power to depart 
from mandatory penalties in the MPCS scheme, but these departures encounter a more demanding 
legal standard. See id. § 7.XX(3)(b), at 265 (“Sentencing courts shall have authority to render an 
extraordinary-departure sentence that deviates from the terms of a mandatory penalty when 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances demonstrate in an individual case that the mandatory 
penalty would result in an unreasonable sentence in light of the purposes in § 1.02(2)(a).”). 
 73. See Reitz, Structure: The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 69, at 156–
60. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. (arguing that American sentencing guidelines systems can be arrayed on a 
continuum from “purely advisory” to “mandatory”). 
 76. Observers with close focus on the federal system often think otherwise. See, g., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 56 (1991); STITH &  CABRANES, supra note 7, at 
143–48 (calling for federal sentencing reform that would have made the then-mandatory federal 
guidelines into advisory guidelines). I share the view that, from a uniquely federal perspective, and 
given the peculiar history of the federal sentencing guidelines, the current advisory system is better 
than the pre-Booker system of enforceable guidelines. The current setup may also be better than any 
legally-enforceable framework Congress is likely to create in the foreseeable future. 
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prison bed spaces should be filled, and have proven essential in state 
systems to the inculcation of meaningful appellate review of trial court 
sentences.77 Each one of these accomplishments is to be celebrated, 
especially given the fact that any success in criminal law reform is 
profoundly surprising. Many observers would say that the course of U.S. 
criminal justice history over the past thirty years has been overwhelmingly 
grim.78 The advent of “better” state guidelines systems, in the ALI’s 
collective judgment, has been one of the bright lights in a predominately 
dark chapter of American law.79 The majority of those “better” systems, 
starting with Minnesota in 1980, has been built around presumptive 
sentencing guidelines.80 
Traumatic injury to the prospects of future adoptions of presumptive 
guidelines systems by state legislatures is therefore regrettable. Five years 
ago, state guidelines systems were about one-half presumptive, one-half 
advisory.81 Since Minnesota implemented the first presumptive guidelines 
in 1980, and Pennsylvania the first advisory system in 1982, there had been 
slow but steady growth of both kinds of structures across roughly twenty 
states. If seen as a race, the two system types were running neck-and-neck.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 77. For the advantages of a presumptive guidelines system, see MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 63–115 (2003). For an extended narrative discussion, 
see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxxiv–xxxv 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). For bulleted points of discussion, see id. at 43–45, which outlines 
ALI’s post-Blakely assessment of presumptive and advisory guidelines systems. 
The ALI’s policy preference for presumptive guidelines, formally approved in Tentative 
Draft No. 1 in 2007, contained an important post-Blakely concession. Advisory guidelines are now 
recognized in the draft as a second-order recommendation for states that choose not to adopt or 
maintain presumptive systems. A series of Official Comments throughout the draft suggest 
amendments to the black-letter statutory language of the MPCS that would transmute the Code’s 
presumptive system into an advisory regime of sentencing “recommendations.” See MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), cmt. p & app. A (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (including the 
appendix which collects all the amendments necessary to switch over to an advisory system). 
 78. This footnote could be expanded beyond the length of this Article. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. 
ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY : CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 94–99 (1996); TODD R. 
CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY: OFFENDERS, V ICTIMS, AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 39–64 
(1994); JAMES Q. WHITMAN , HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 (2003). 
 79. See Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. 
CRIM. L. &  CRIMINOLOGY 696, 707 (1995) (“Sentencing guidelines are strongly associated with 
comparatively slow prison population growth whenever the legislature charged the sentencing 
commission to consider prison capacity when establishing presumptive sentencing 
ranges. . . . These findings are a refreshing departure from the usual negative results when 
evaluating criminal justice reforms.”). 
 80. The reliance of the MPCS project on the “Minnesota Model” is acknowledged in the 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 50–63 (2003). 
 81. See Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient?: Overview of State Sentencing 
Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 446 tbl. (2000). 
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This scorecard has changed noticeably in the aftermath of Blakely v. 
Washington, decided in 2004. To avoid Justice O’Connor’s constitutional 
tax, presumptive guidelines systems in Tennessee and Ohio were converted 
into advisory schemes, one by statute and the other by judicial opinion.82 
The loss of the Ohio system is especially unfortunate because it was one of 
the most innovative sentencing guidelines schemes in the country. It 
worked with narrative principles rather than a two-dimensional grid and 
provided the foundation for a rich and growing body of sentencing law in 
the appellate courts.83 Ohio’s system was also one of the state sentencing 
reforms that had been most successful at restraining aggregate prison 
growth since its implementation in 1996.84 The MPCS had intended to hold 
out Ohio to other states as a promising alternative format for enforceable 
sentencing guidelines;85 post-Blakely, Ohio’s system is now a formerly-
promising, defunct alternative. This is a shame for Ohio itself, but also an 
injury to other states that may in future years have been inspired to follow 
Ohio’s lead. 
Another single-state Blakely story with potential ripple effects unfolded 
in Massachusetts. Legislation to adopt presumptive guidelines was pending 
in that state when Blakely was decided in June 2004.86 Although the 
proposed Massachusetts system would have been one of the most 
progressive in the nation by giving judges, for example, the power to 
depart from some mandatory minimum penalties,87 the legislation had to be 
withdrawn following Blakely because it was constitutionally defective.88 
Although the chances of enactment were less than certain before Blakely, 
Massachusetts was poised to become the first major Northeastern state to 
adopt a presumptive system that borrowed from—and even improved 
upon—other jurisdictions using the Minnesota model. Massachusetts’ 
enactment of presumptive guidelines would have been a major event on the 
national scene—the kind other states notice, study, and think about 
emulating. Blakely, however, snuffed the candle. 
                                                                                                                     
 82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210(c) (West 2005); State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 498 
(Ohio 2006) (declaring formerly presumptive statutory guidelines are now advisory).  
 83. See Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead 
of Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002) (including a useful 
discussion of appellate case law under the state’s new sentencing principles).  
 84. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 25 fig.2 (Council Draft No. 2, 
2008). 
 85. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.02 cmt. c, at 172–73 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007). 
 86. See Francis J. Carney, Jr., Developing Sentencing Guidelines in Massachusetts: A Work 
in Progress, 20 L. &  POL’Y 247, 248 (1998) (outlining the Massachusetts proposal). 
 87. Id.  
 88. For outlines of the Massachusetts proposal, which had been many years in the making, see 
id. Regarding the failure of the legislation in the 2004 session, I rely on a personal communication 
from William Leahy, Chief Counsel, Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services (Sept. 
9, 2005). 
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In the post-Blakely period, only Alabama has moved to a sentencing-
commission-sentencing-guidelines framework, choosing to adopt an 
advisory guidelines structure.89 In 2007, California went far along the path 
to enacting sentencing reform based on the commission-guidelines model, 
but one complication along the way was the specter of trials of fact at 
sentencing hearings.90 (California was at the time dealing with the probable 
impact of Blakely on its statutory sentencing scheme, which the Supreme 
Court invalidated in Cunningham v. California.)91 To my knowledge, no 
state in the country is presently contemplating sentencing reform based on 
the Minnesota presumptive guidelines model. In the difficult terrain of 
comprehensive, whole-system reform, always an ambitious undertaking, 
Blakely gives favored status to a second-best solution. 
There have been additional B akely costs. Even in states that retain 
presumptive guidelines systems post-Blakely, some chose to compromise 
their guidelines in order to reduce the number of jury trials required for 
aggravated sentences. Minnesota and Washington, most notably, widened 
their guidelines ranges to allow judges greater unguided discretion to 
pronounce aggravated sentences.92 Alaska made a similar change to a 
system that shares some attributes of presumptive guidelines.93 In these 
jurisdictions, the guidelines now provide weaker restraints upon the 
severity of sentences, and probably have lost some of the predictive power 
necessary for accurate fiscal and demographic impact statements.94 In 
addition, the strange incentives emanating from Blakely have supplied new 
ammunition to proponents of parole release discretion—another 
development at odds with the best wisdom of the MPCS project.95 A 
number of state courts have held that indeterminate guidelines systems—
where guidelines coexist with parole release agencies—are exempt from 
Blakely’s jury trial jurisprudence.96 The state courts are probably right, but 
the policy implications are unfortunate. 
If collective wisdom of the ALI is correct that presumptive sentencing 
guidelines systems are the rarest of prizes—an example of successful 
reform in American criminal justice, then the multi-decade project of 
sentencing reform in the states took a blow from Blakely from which it 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See generally Pryor, supra note 7 (discussing sentencing reform in Alabama). 
 90. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007). 
 91. Id. 
 92. For the marginal injuries suffered by the Minnesota system, see Richard S. Frase, Blakely 
in Minnesota, Two Years Out: Guidelines Sentencing is Alive and Well, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 
80 (2006). For Washington State’s departure guidelines, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.535, 
.537 (West 2005). 
 93. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(a), (f) (2008). 
 94. See supra Part III.A. 
 95. See infra Part III.C. 
 96. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 437–
39 (2005); see also People v. Drohan, 715 N.W.2d 778, 791 (Mich. 2006). 
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may not soon recover. However, the MPCS project may act as a 
counterweight to Blakely and the newly-slanted playing field that tilts 
toward advisory guidelines. The ALI clearly intends that it do so. But this 
has become more of an uphill battle than it would have appeared in 2003 
when the “race” between presumptive and advisory guidelines was still 
very close across sentencing reform jurisdictions. 
C.  Determinacy, Indeterminacy, or Some of Both? 
Beyond the question of sentencing guidelines, important insights 
concerning mechanisms for prison release decisions have sprung from the 
latest round of drafting in the MPCS project. The ALI’s thorough and 
deliberative process has led to the observation that academics and 
policymakers have been too categorical in making a sharp separation 
between “determinate” and “indeterminate” sentencing structures.97 The 
standard definition of an “indeterminate” sentencing system—which 
applied to all U.S. jurisdictions as recently as 1974—is a system in which 
judges sentence offenders to prison for an indefinite term, often a wide 
range of years, subject to large reservoirs of discretion in a parole board to 
determine the actual release date of each inmate.98 Historically, parole 
boards were created because law reformers of the Progressive Era believed 
most criminals could be rehabilitated during a prison term, but they also 
thought it was impossible to know ahead of time how long this personal 
transformation would take.99 Reformers of that era trusted that a parole 
board with sufficient information and expertise could discern, case-by-
case, when the rehabilitative process had in fact taken hold.100  
The standard definition of a “determinate” sentencing system posits the 
absence of a parole board with prison release authority—or parole-release 
abolition. Typically, in such systems the sentence pronounced in the 
courtroom bears a close and predictable relation to the sentence that will in 
fact be served by the offender. The prisoner may still be awarded good 
time credits, but the potential discount from good-time adjustments is 
usually less than the sentence discount (or premium) controlled by parole 
boards in indeterminate structures. In addition, good time is in theory 
dispensed or withheld on relatively fixed criteria relating to an inmate’s 
conduct in the institution, rather than predictions of his future behavior. 
The traditional definitions are not wrong, so far as they go, but they 
oversimplify. Intensive state-by-state inquiries carried out in the MPCS 
project over the past two years—and searching debates among the 
                                                                                                                     
 97. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 31 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 69 (1980). 
 100. For the best historical account, tracing the theory and practice of the parole release 
process from the 1890s into the 1970s, see id. at 44. 
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Advisers, MCG, and Council Members—have led to new ways of 
conceptualizing the systemic architecture of prison-release. As a threshold 
matter, it is important to recognize that there are pockets of determinacy 
and indeterminacy in every American jurisdiction’s arrangements for 
prison sentences. While the most important policy choice faced in each 
jurisdiction is which approach is superior as a general platform, sub-issues 
abound. Even among state systems that the literature categorizes as strictly 
“determinate,” manifold prison release mechanisms exist to qualify the 
description: some still use parole release for certain offenses, nearly all 
award good-time credits—and some good-time formulas are generous 
indeed, some permit judicial resentencing months or even years into a 
prison term, most have provisions for the compassionate release of inmates 
who are seriously ill or disabled, some authorize sentence reductions for 
extraordinary acts of heroism by prisoners, and all recognize a clemency 
power with potential to operate as a legal deus ex machina—albeit seldom 
exercised these days.101 
We are poorly equipped to know the best way to shape, mix, and match 
the above grab-bag of prison release authorities. Sixteen years ago, Kay 
Knapp wrote that few people in each state actually understood, as a 
technical matter, how release calculations were to be made.102 That may 
still be true today. Worse, there is little or no evaluation literature of the 
various mechanisms of indeterminacy catalogued above. Even if we had a 
strong grasp of their legal attributes, we would not know which ones to 
cheer, and which to deride. 
Recent MPCS drafts have struggled mightily with these issues. Council 
Draft No. 2, the latest in the series, addresses questions of parole release 
discretion (which the draft would abolish), good time (which the draft 
would retain, although there remains uncertainty about the best formulation 
of the provision), compassionate release (which the draft would retain and 
expand in scope beyond most existing state provisions), and a novel 
mechanism for a judicial “second look”—a power of sentence 
modification—deep into the execution of long-term prison sentences 
(which would have been a wholly new proposal not based on prior state or 
federal law).103 
All of these subject areas are important, difficult, and have been 
insufficiently studied in the past, but the innovative “second look” 
provision has generated by far the most prolonged disagreement in the 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See generally American Bar Ass’n, ABA Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions: 
Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System: Report of the Second Look 
Roundtable 4–6 (Mar. 15, 2009). 
 102. Kay A. Knapp, A Reply to Professor Alschuler, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 737, 738 (1993). 
 103. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 85–102 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). There is no draft 
provision at present that speaks to the clemency power, nor was there in the original Model Penal 
Code. 
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current drafting cycle. This is reflected in numerous changes of direction in 
black-letter proposals over successive drafts. The first draft to grapple with 
the question of prison release, in 2007, contained no second-look 
provision.104 The second draft, in early 2008, featured an expansive 
second-look provision that would have authorized trial judges to perform 
many of the functions previously assigned to parole boards, albeit in an 
environment of transparency, enforceable rules, and reviewability of 
decisions.105 The next draft, Council Draft No. 2, published in later 2008, 
fell back to a much narrowed second-look process intended to affect only a 
small percentage of prisoners who had served at least fifteen years of even 
longer prison sentences.106 Following the Council’s meeting in December 
2008, it seems that even the narrowed provision will not go forward as ALI 
policy. Instead, the Council has asked the Reporter to lay out a variety of 
options for states to consider—with a judicial second-look mechanism as 
one possibility—for adding a component of indeterminacy to especially 
long prison terms. No specific recommendation has gained support. 
The zigs and zags taken by the second-look provision expose a series of 
difficulties that have not been dealt with adequately or explicitly in 
American law. If one takes the view that a determinate sentencing scheme 
is generally preferable to an indeterminate arrangement (a conclusion that 
has not been controversial in the ALI), one eventually is faced with special 
problems attached to extremely long sentences. In a purely determinate 
regime, for example, all life sentences would be penalties of life-without-
parole (LWOP). The United States, compared with other developed 
nations, already imposes an extraordinary number of LWOP and other life 
sentences,107 along with high numbers of lengthy prison terms stretching 
forward twenty, thirty, and forty years.108 For those who believe that many 
                                                                                                                     
 104. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2007). 
 105. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 78–84 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008). 
 106. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 85–102 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). 
 107. As of 2004, more than 33,000 prisoners in the United States were serving life sentences 
with no possibility of release. See MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF 
“L IFE”:  LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 9 (2004). Elsewhere in the developed world, natural 
life sentences remain rare. Id. at 28. No such sanction exists in Canada, where the most severe 
available penalty is a life sentence with parole eligibility at twenty-five years. See Canada, Criminal 
Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 745 (2009). Many European criminal justice systems authorize, yet rarely 
employ such a penalty. See Catherine Appleton & Brent Grøver, The Pros and Cons of Life without 
Parole, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 603, 610 (2007). In the United Kingdom—a nation with one-
fifth the United States population, only twenty-two prisoners were serving “whole life” sentences in 
2005. Id. at 603. A few nations, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have declared natural life 
sentences unconstitutional. Id at 610. 
 108. Thirty-nine separate cells of the federal sentencing guidelines include penalties of thirty 
years or more without departure from the guidelines. 3 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL  1277 (2008). Even the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines, which produce the second-lowest per capita prison population in the nation, authorize 
prison sentences of up to forty years, without departure, at the top of the grid for second-degree 
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American prison sentences are excessive, determinacy without 
qualification would lock in the worst of our sentencing mistakes. As 
Council Draft No. 2 argued: 
When a legal system imposes the heaviest of incarcerative 
penalties, it ought to be the most wary of its own powers and 
alert to opportunities for the correction of errors. On this 
principle, determinate sentences are least justifiable as they 
extend in length from months and years to decades. Both 
moral and consequentialist judgments become suspect when 
their effects are projected forward into a distant future. 
 
On proportionality grounds, societal assessments of 
offense gravity and offender culpability sometimes change 
over the course of a generation or comparable period. In 
recent history, for example, there has been flux in community 
attitudes toward some classes of drug offenders, and even in 
crime categories as serious as homicide, such as when a 
battered spouse kills an abusive husband or in cases of 
assisted suicide. The prospect of changing norms, which 
might render a proportionate prison sentence of one era 
disproportionate in the next, is of greatest concern for 
extremely long confinement terms. 
 
On utilitarian premises, lengthy sentences may also fail to 
age gracefully. The cumulation of knowledge may reveal that 
sentences thought to be well founded in one era were in fact 
misconceived. An optimist might hope and expect this to be 
so. For example, research into risk assessment technologies 
has from time to time yielded significant improvements. A 
prediction of recidivism risk made today may not be 
consistent with the state of prediction science twenty years 
later. Similarly, with ongoing research, new and effective 
rehabilitative or reintegrative interventions may become 
available for long-term inmates who previously were thought 
resistant to change. It is unsound to freeze criminal 
punishments of extraordinary duration into the knowledge 
base of the past.109  
This final subject of this Article is far from an end point in the ALI 
process. Unlike the DIS and the preference for presumptive over advisory 
guidelines, the ALI will continue for at least another year to study the 
question of how best to preserve the benefits of a generally determinate 
sentencing structure, while making special allowance for the unique 
American tendency to authorize and impose extremely long prison terms. 
Already, however, the ALI has brought attention to a badly neglected 
                                                                                                                     
murder. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY 57 (2008). 
 109. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.10A cmt. b, at 59–60 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). 
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subfield of sentencing law, having to do with low-visibility mechanisms 
for indeterminacy, attached to even the most definite-seeming of penalties. 
No one has yet given adequate time and energy to the question of when the 
edifice of determinacy should give way to other concerns, or how back-end 
release discretion should best be organized and exercised when it exists. 
Having identified this gap, the MPCS will continue its pursuit of sensible 
recommendations. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This Article has touched on only a small fraction of the MPCS corpus. 
The other authors in this symposium issue focus elsewhere, and 
demonstrate one of the greatest advantages of the MPCS undertaking: 
Because the Model Penal Code is something of a “brand name,” both in 
academic and legislative domains, any revision of its terms attracts the 
close attention of many knowledgeable people. The Reporter could not be 
more grateful for thoughtful input of this kind. The recommendations 
contained in the revised Code always reflect the collective wisdom of a 
small army of experts who have given selfless attention to the difficult 
problems of criminal sentencing. 
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